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Chibuike Uche 
The European Union and                              
Monetary Integration in West Africa      
I.  
This paper argues that developments in Europe have been the most impor-
tant variable in monetary integration in West Africa. It shows how mone-
tary integration in West Africa has historically been influenced by two 
colonial powers: Britain and France and the state of the relationship be-
tween these two European countries. The consequence of the above is that 
Britain and France have become major stakeholders in West Africa and 
failure to consult them in monetary integration matters in the region has 
always led to suboptimal results in the integration process. The modest 
monetary integration success that has been achieved by the Francophone 
West African countries for instance have been extensively aided by France 
which has acted as the agency of restraint to the arrangement. On the other 
hand ECOWAS wide regional integration arrangements have been mainly 
unsuccessful because of the sometimes divergent interests of France and 
Britain in the region. The consequence is that the idea of a unified West 
African monetary area has always failed to gain the support of the two  
powerful European stakeholders. Specifically, neither Britain nor France is 
willing to act as an agency of restraint for the entire West Africa. The ab-
sence of an agency of restraint also explains the inability of Nigeria and 
Ghana to achieve the establishment of a second monetary zone in the re-
gion. The new program, unfortunately, has provided no institutional 
framework for dealing with outside stakeholders. Despite the above short-
comings, the paper argues that the changing political landscape in Europe Chibuike Uche 
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may alter the nature of incentives behind the interest of foreign stakehol-
ders in the region. This in itself could create new opportunities for a region 
wide monetary integration program in West Africa. To achieve its aim, this 
paper, including the current introductory section (Part One), is divided into 
seven parts. Part Two traces the origins of monetary integration in the West 
African sub-region while Part Three critiques the post-independence 
ECOWAS wide monetary integration programs in the sub region. Part Four 
analyses the operations of the monetary integration program in post inde-
pendence Francophone West Africa while Part Five examines the origins 
and operational modalities of the Second Monetary Zone. Part Six attempts 
an analysis of the future direction and opportunities for an ECOWAS-wide 
monetary integration Program while Part Seven concludes the paper.  
II.  
The idea of monetary integration in West Africa dates back to the colonial 
era. With the partitioning of Africa and the imposition of colonial rule, 
Britain and France emerged as the main beneficiaries of the territories of 
West Africa. In British West Africa, for instance, Britain quickly moved to 
put in place an economic and political system for the smooth functioning of 
its colonies. One of the consequences of the above development was the 
establishment of the West African Currency Board (WACB) in 1912. 
 
The WACB, which was headquartered in London, was mandated to "pro-
vide for and to control the supply of currency to the British West African 
Colonies, Protectorates and Trust Territories." In practice however, the 
board was no more than a Bureau de Change issuing as much local curren-
cy as the banks wanted to buy for sterling and vice versa. It was therefore 
not in the technical sense, a monetary authority. Such a system, however, 
satisfied the Bank of England’s monetary policy objective of achieving 
price stability in the colonies. The price stability policy was also compa-The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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Price stability and parity conversion however had their cost: the ability of 
the WACB to create credit was severely hampered. This pre-central bank-
ing system also perpetuated a situation where large parts of Nigerian Go-
vernment funds were held abroad. This further reduced the amount of mo-
ney available for indigenous development. Access to credit was indeed 
what the Africans, rightly or wrongly, believed that they needed most if 
they were to break away from the shackles of colonialism. Dispensing with 
the colonial monetary system in favor of a central bank was therefore an 
integral part of throwing off the economic shackles of colonialism. Political 
factors were also at work in accelerating the change process. "Colonial ter-
ritories seeking some measure of political independence have tended to re-
gard a Central Bank as an outward and visible sign of independence and the 
lack of one as signifying continued subjection."
2 In fact Africans generally 
saw the WACB system as "the financial hallmark of colonialism."  
  
It was thus not surprising that once political independence became immi-
nent for the British West African countries, they all jettisoned the WACB 
in favor of a central bank. In 1957, for instance, Ghana pulled out of the 
WACB and established its own currency. In 1958, Nigeria set up its own 
central bank and adopted the Naira as its currency. Sierra Leone followed 
suit in 1963 adopting the Leone as its national currency while Gambia set 
up its own central bank in 1971 and adopted the Dalasi as its national cur-
rency. All that Britain did was to enshrine in the statutes of the above cen-
tral banks, which it helped establish, regulations limiting the money 
creation functions of the new central banks. In Nigeria, for instance, the 
1958 Central Bank of Nigeria Act explicitly stipulated that, at least for a 
period of five years of its coming into force, the value of external reserves 
 
1 Uche, C.U. (1997) Bank of England Vs The IBRD: Did the Nigerian Colony Deserve 
a Central Bank?, Explorations in Economic History 34, p. 220. 
2 Sayers, R. (1957), Central Banking after Bagehot (Oxford, Clarendon Press), p. 117. Chibuike Uche 
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to be maintained by the central bank should not be less than the aggregate 
of an amount representing 60 percent of the Bank’s notes and coins in cir-
culation together with an amount representing 35 percent of the Bank’s 
other demand liabilities.   
 
The Francophone West African countries also have a somewhat similar 
monetary integration history. The process there dates back to the pre-
independence era. For most of the French colonial rule, these colonies were 
organized under one colonial administration as the French West African 
Federation. By the 1930’s, France had undertaken to issue currencies in 
each colony that would be firmly linked to the French Franc. Many of these 
currencies in the French African colonies were subsequently consolidated 
into “le franc des Colonies Francaises d’Afrique” (CFA Franc). The objec-
tive for setting up this broad franc zone included (i) convertibility into 
French Francs at a fixed parity; (ii) free capital mobility throughout the 
zone; (iii) pooling of most foreign exchange reserves at the French trea-
sury; (iv) the establishment of a common trade and financial policy vis-à-
vis the rest of the world and; (v) guarantee of convertibility by France 
through the establishment of “operation accounts” for each colonial central 
bank with the French Treasury.
3  
 
By 1958, most of the French colonies had become autonomous within the 
French West African Federation. Only Guinea opted for complete political 
independence in the Gaullist referendum held that year. Even with the 1958 
political developments, the degree of economic integration among these 
former French colonies remained high. It was only with the advent of poli- 
tical independence of these French colonies (1960), when the federation 
broke up into independent countries that barriers to trade and movement of 
 
3 Boughton, J. (1991), The CFA Franc Zone: Currency Union and Monetary Standard, 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper Number WP/91/133 (Washington D.C., 
International Monetary Fund), p. 1-2.  The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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factors of production began to emerge.
4 With political independence, se-
veral attempts at forming a pan-Francophone body in the region failed. 
This was mainly because France opposed the formation of any strong fe-
deration in the region. In 1959, for instance, France successfully blocked 
the establishment of a potentially strong political federation comprising of 
Senegal, Benin (then Dahomey) and Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta). In-
stead, it preferred to encourage the establishment of customs union among 
its former colonies. This was because France was mainly interested “in 
maintaining easy access to the markets of her former colonies”.
5 This was 
the motivation behind the French support for the establishment of Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) in 1962.  
 
Under the currency arrangements of 1962, France specifically guaranteed 
the value and convertibility of the CFA Franc by tying it to the value of the 
French Franc. Basically, this was simply an extension of the pre-
independence monetary arrangements in the region.
6 The implication of 
this is that these central banks could only, as before, influence the money 
supply in their territories by drawing on their overdraft account with the 
French Treasury. In practice, the cost of this arrangement on the French 
economy has been insignificant. Although France may consider this as an 
aid to Francophone African countries, such an arrangement also has bene-
fits for France. This is because while the “cost of maintaining the Zone is 
borne by the French State…. the currency convertibility it guarantees with 




4 Manu, M. (1989), The Future of ECOWAS, The Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs Lecture Series Number 49 (Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs), 
p. 4. 
5 Mytelka, L.K. (1974), A Genealogy of Francophone West and Equatorial African Re-
gional Organizations, The Journal of Modern African Studies 12, p. 300. 
6 Boughton, J.M. (1992), CFA Franc: Zone of Fragile Stability in Africa, Finance and 
Development, p. 29, p. 34-35. 
7 Moncrieff, R. (2001), Growing Up With the Umbilical Cord Attached: Developments 
in the African franc Zone: 1994-2001, Research Document, Foreign and Common-
wealth Office London, p. 4.  Chibuike Uche 
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It is perhaps because of its minimal costs and its attendant benefits that the 
French authorities were, at least at the beginning, unwilling to enforce the 
strict regulations for the operations of the overdraft account with the Trea-
sury. This is perhaps one of the main reasons why the system survived the 
gaining of independence by most Francophone West African states. Like 
the WACB, this monetary arrangement guaranteed these former French 
colonies price stability. Unlike the WACB, however, money supply could 
be expanded, under the Francophone arrangement, by the participating cen-
tral banks. This gave the central banks of the newly independent Franco-
phone states relatively more powers to influence their economic 
environment.  
 
Another reason that ensured the long-term survival of the CFA Franc Zone 
was the decisiveness of France in dealing with its colonies that refused to 
tow its preferred line of action. The total excommunication of Guinea se-
quel to its 1958 referendum vote for independence is an example of this. It 
is perhaps the fear of such reprisals and the benefits of monetary stability 
that the CFA Franc Zone guarantees that made most Francophone West 
African states reluctant to radically alter their relationship with France even 
after independence. Under such circumstances, the French Treasury has 
been able to act as an effective agency of restraint for monetary stability in 
Francophone West Africa. In the next section we will show how the lack-
luster performance of an ECOWAS wide monetary integration program has 
in the main been caused by lack of consultation with outside stakeholders 
and the absence of a credible authority that can serve as an agency of re-
straint.  The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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III.  
Despite the geographical proximity of the West African countries, coloni-
zation made it difficult for them to relate with their neighbors. This was 
true both among Francophone and Anglophone states. Essentially, the Brit-
ish and French authorities were only interested in promoting trade between 
the individual colonies and their respective home countries. This was main-
ly because what attracted the foreign commercial institutions to the conti-
nent was the availability of cheap and abundant raw materials, which could 
service European factories. There was thus no commercial interest in pro-
moting intra regional trade. Most of the infrastructure the British colonial 
masters put in place was thus aimed at helping evacuate minerals and raw 
materials from the hinterland to the coastal regions for onward transporta-
tion to Europe. This sometimes resulted in the establishment of cross-
colony infrastructure. This was especially so with respect to landlocked 
countries. Mali, for instance, was linked to Senegal by rail. This ensured 
that raw materials and minerals from Mali could be exported through the 
seaport of Dakar. Burkina Faso, another landlocked country, was also 
linked by rail to Abidjan. This, no doubt, was commercially driven. Tele-
communication and air transport arrangements were all aimed at servicing 
inter-continental rather than intra regional trade. Even to date, inter-
continental communication, in most cases, is easier and cheaper than intra 
West African communications. It is, for instance, usually faster for a letter 
from, say, Nigeria to Senegal, to go via Europe than direct.
8    
 
The advent of political independence for most of the countries in the West 
African sub region led to a rethink of the pre-independence economic rela-
tionships among these geographical neighbors. While some of these West 
African countries openly canvassed the idea of regional integration, others, 
because of “deep suspicions and political and ideological differences,” 
 
8 Uche, C.U. (2001), The Politics of Monetary Sector Cooperation Among the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States Members, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Number 2647 (Washington DC, World Bank), p. 27. Chibuike Uche 
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Despite the reservations about supranationality, the spirit of nationalism 
and the euphoria of independence ensured the prevalence of the view, 
among African leaders, of the need to end African economic dependence 
on the West. Most of the West African countries subsequently adopted Im-
port Substitution Strategies (ISS) as a first step towards entering into re-
gional integration arrangements. This strategy however proved 
unsuccessful for various reasons.
10 
 
With a failed ISS program, most West African economies remained prima-
ry product based. This made difficult the development of a sustainable ba-
sis for regional integration. It is thus not surprising that most of the bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements in the region are no more than political 
agreements, which have very little influence on real economic integration. 
Despite these arrangements, trade among these neighbors, till date, remains 
insignificant.  
 
Low regional trade was interpreted in some circles to be a consequence of 
the payments system in place at the time. Along these lines, the Association 
of African Central Banks, in 1972, set up a Study Group to examine trade 
and monetary relations in the West African sub-region. The report argued 
that the problems of intra-sub-regional trade payments arise not so much 
from the insufficiency of existing facilities for effecting payments as from 
the long delays encountered in receiving payments. Such delays arise main-
ly because of balance of trade difficulties and scarcity of foreign exchange 
in member states. The report thus concluded that the “establishment of 
 
9 Economic Community of West African States (1992), Review of the ECOWAS 
Treaty: Final Report by the Committee of Eminent Persons, p. 16. 
10 See Aryeetey, E. (2001), Regional Integration in West Africa, OECD Development 
Centre Technical Paper Number 170, p. 13. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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some type of payment arrangements that would facilitate prompt receipt of 
export proceeds by exporters would stimulate intra-sub-regional trade.”  
 
In 1973, the Association of African Central Banks set up another study 
group to recommend guidelines for the establishment of a clearing ar-
rangement between member states of the West African sub-region. Their 
report recommended the following operational modalities: membership of 
the clearing house should be made optional; payments for transactions 
among BCEAO member countries, which already have an agreement, 
should not be channeled through the West African Clearing House 
(WACH); all intra sub-regional transactions, except inter-government 
grants and loans, should be channeled through WACH; payments for all 
goods, except re-exports should be eligible for settlement through WACH; 
all the accounting transactions of the clearing house be conducted in a West 
African Unit of Account (WAUA) which is to be fixed to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Right at a given parity; the settle-
ment period for all debts under WACH should be one month and; each 
country should extend a global interim credit line (based on a percentage of 
total intra sub-regional trade) to the rest of the sub region as a whole. 
WACH was subsequently established in 1975.  
 
Operationally, the payment mechanism of WACH was similar to the clear-
ing transaction by national central banks of cheques submitted by commer-
cial banks, with the clearing house acting like a national central bank and 
the clearing banks acting like commercial banks. At the time WACH was 
introduced, a clearing-house system made sense in the sub region. There 
were 10 currencies, most of which were inconvertible, being used among 
the 16 member states of ECOWAS.  These currencies fell under two main 
monetary zones: the West African Sterling Area and the Franc Zone. The 
West African Sterling Area comprised of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and 
Nigeria while the Franc Zone comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Fa-
so, Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin. At least three of the countries in the re-Chibuike Uche 
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gion did not belong to any of these two monetary regimes already men-
tioned (Guinea, Liberia and Guinea Bissau).  
 
Within the franc zone, trade in goods and services was generally free from 
controls and transfers of payments from such transactions were also not 
restricted. There was also free movement of capital within the area. Trade 
with non-Francophone West African states was however subject to varied 
degrees of restrictions.  Capital movements to these countries were also 
restricted. In the Sterling Area, however, the situation was different. Every 
country had its own central bank, issued its own currency and followed in-
dependent monetary, exchange and credit policies. Although sometimes 
loose arrangements between central banks of these countries existed, espe-
cially for the settlement of certain government accounts, like embassy ac-
counts, there was generally no co-ordination of policies.
11 With the 
exception of the Gambia, there were also quantitative restrictions on trade 
in goods and services as well as capital movement within the West African 
Sterling Area.  
 
In practice however, the introduction of WACH did very little to promote 
trade in the sub region. This was perhaps because no interested party was 
willing to subsidize the system. Nigeria, with its oil wealth at the time, was 
in a position to do this. It however failed to do so. Against the recommen-
dation of the 1973 WACH Study Group, Nigeria refused, from the begin-
ning, to channel trade in its major foreign exchange earner-oil- through the 
clearinghouse mechanism. Despite the fact that WACH had similar objec-
tives with ECOWAS, Nigeria refused to make this important sacrifice. Al-
though Nigeria was instrumental to the establishment of ECOWAS, its 
gradually worsening economic conditions made it difficult for the country 
to support the body effectively, by acting as the hegemon. In fact, the rapid 
 
11 Association of West African Central Banks [West African Sub-Regional Group] 
(1973), Report of the Study Group on Guidelines for the Establishment of a Clearing 
Arrangement Between Member States of the Sub-Regional Committee (Unpub-
lished), p. 4. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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economic deterioration of the country and lack of fiscal policy restraint by 
successive governments caused it to become a risk rather than an asset to 
the entire ECOWAS integration process.
12 This is so because the country 
constitutes over 50 percent of the ECOWAS economy. A fiscally unstable 
Nigeria will thus be a danger to a financially integrated ECOWAS. Without 
any willing and able hegemonial power in the region, it was not surprising 
that intra regional trade only recorded minimal increases and the achieve-
ment of the objective of monetary integration, across colonial lines, is still 
far from reality. It was also not surprising that the introduction of WACH 
did little to improve trade and economic integration in the sub region.  
 
The fortunes of WACH started to change for the worse in the mid 1980s, 
when an increasing number of ECOWAS member states started adopting 
various forms of Structural Adjustment Programs. This led to the relaxation 
of exchange controls and the adoption of market determined exchange 
rates.  This in turn led to a drastic decline in the level of transactions chan-
neled through WACH.
13 It therefore became obvious that it was only a mat-
ter of time before WACH became redundant and irrelevant.  
 
In 1987, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the 
ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Program (EMCP) in Abuja, Nigeria. The 
main objective of this EMCP is the adoption of collective policy measures 
in order to achieve a harmonized monetary system and common manage-
ment institutions. The specific objectives, designed to be achieved, over 
time include: 
 
12 Masson, P. and Pattillo, C. (2004), A Single Currency for Africa? Finance and De-
velopment (December), p. 13. 
13 Asante, R. (1995), The Transformation of a Clearing House into a Specialized Mone-
tary Agency, Paper Presented at the Workshop on the Future role of COMESA Clear-
ing House (Harare, Zimbabwe, 21-22 August 1995), p. 2; and, the West African 
Clearing House, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (1989/1990), p. 5. Chibuike Uche 
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•  To facilitate, in the short term, regional trade transactions by improv-
ing and strengthening the multilateral regional payments and clearing 
system of the WACH; 
 
•  To achieve, in the medium term, regional currency convertibility 
through the more liberal use of national currencies in intra-regional 
trade transactions, at market related exchange rates; 
 
•  In the long term, to establish a single monetary zone characterized by 
the use of a common convertible currency, managed by a common 
central bank, and supported by a convertibility guarantee arrange-
ment with an appropriate external body. 
 
In order to achieve the above policy objectives, a number of policy mea-
sures were outlined for implementation during the transitional period of 7 
years (1987 to 1994). The short term policy measures were: the clearing of 
outstanding payments arrears in the WACH system; the introduction of a 
new payments instrument such as West African Travelers’ Cheques and 
Bills of Exchange through the clearing system; the introduction of a Credit 
Guarantee Fund in the WACH system; the transformation of WACH into a 
specialized monetary agency of ECOWAS; the removal of non-tariff bar-
riers of monetary nature; and the extension of the range of eligible products 
and other transactions channeled through the clearing system.  
 
The medium and long term policy measures include: the adjustment of ex-
change rates of regional currencies to equilibrium levels; liberalization of 
current and capital transactions within the region; the adoption of an 
ECOWAS exchange rate system based on the market; the adoption of a 
common central bank credit ceiling of 20 percent to government based on 
the previous years’ fiscal receipts; the adoption of a market oriented ap-
proach in the use of available monetary policy tools; the adoption of the The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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calendar year as financial year; and achievement of single digit inflation 
rate. The potential benefits of the EMCP were identified as follows: 
 
•  The possibilities of reaping the benefit of scale in monetary manage-
ment; 
 
•  Greater efficiency and rational use and allocation of scarce human, 
material and financial resources; 
 
•  The facilitation of intra regional trade and payment transactions as 
the use of a common currency would effectively create a single re-
gional market over a wider geographical area of sixteen countries 
with over 200 million people; 
 
•  The spin-off effect of the use of a single currency will facilitate 
greater inflow of foreign capital and stem capital flight as a result of 
the improved credibility of the region in international monetary and 
financial circles; 
 
•  The elimination of widespread and illegal speculative cross border 
currency trafficking activities with its price distortions which en-
courage smuggling activities; 
 
•  Savings in the use of foreign exchange involved in intra regional 
trade and payments transaction.  
 
In line with some of the above objectives, ECOWAS, in 1991, set up a 
study group to examine the possibility of redefining the objectives and ac-
tivities of WACH with the view of adapting it to the economic trends in the 
sub region. In October 1991 the committee recommended that in the long Chibuike Uche 
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run, WACH should be transformed into a specialized agency of ECOWAS. 
This decision was adopted by the Governors in February 1992, and ap-
proved by ECOWAS Heads of State in July 1993. This culminated in the 
establishment of the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 1994. 
WAMA was mandated to: promote monetary co-operation and payment 
issues within the context of the economic and monetary integration of the 
region; initiate and promote policies and programs for achieving monetary 
integration; facilitate the harmonization and co-ordination of macro-
economic policies and structural adjustment programs of member states 
and; ensure the establishment of a single monetary zone.
14 In order to har-
monize the region’s economies for subsequent integration, the following 
convergence criteria were set: all member states to reduce the ratio of 
budget deficit to GDP to a maximum of 3 percent; the governments of all 
member states to reduce progressively their borrowing from the central 
bank to a ceiling of 10 percent of the previous years’ fiscal revenue; the 
maintenance of a single digit inflation rate for all countries; countries with 
floating regimes should reduce variability of nominal exchange rates to less 
than 5 percent. For countries with non-floating exchange rate regimes any 
over-valuations should be eliminated.  
 
In reality, ECOWAS member states decided to go for deeper monetary in-
tegration (single monetary zone) despite the fact that they failed to success-
fully run a much simpler scheme (clearing house).
15 This perhaps explains 
the poor performance of WAMA since its establishment. In 1990, for in-
stance, the earlier transition period towards monetary integration was modi-
fied to 2000. This has subsequently, in 1998, extended to 2004. More re-
cently, 2010 have now been set as the new target date despite the fact that 
the methodology of this transition still remains unclear.
16  
 
14 Asante, 1995, p. 5.  
15 Uche, 2001, p. 30. 
16 According to the 2007 Annual Report of WAMA: “Giving credence to the need to 
accelerate the monetary cooperation programme and the fact that some countries 
have currently satisfied the basic requirements…. [a WAMA background] paper sub-
sequently proposed the following three options, each of which could be implemented The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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A major hindrance to the existence and effectiveness of ECOWAS-wide 
monetary integration programs has been the lack of political will by mem-
ber states and the existence of a strong Francophone regional grouping with 
similar objectives.
17 Despite the replacement of WACH with WAMA, most 
of the fundamental problems that had frustrated the activities of WACH 
remain ever present. What ECOWAS did was simply to sweep them under 
the carpet. The major problem is that most ECOWAS member states are 
weak in infrastructure, economically and politically. They represent some 
of the poorest states in the world.  Among themselves, they have done little 
to promote integration. This is mainly because the short-term costs of look-
ing inwards could be high with little or no attendant short-term benefits. 
For instance, should regional co-operation go contrary to the interest of 
non-regional member countries, some of these ECOWAS member states 
run the risk of losing development aid and debt relief programs on which 
their economies depend. On the other hand, there is no ECOWAS member 
country that is strong enough to act as a hegemon to its brother states. The 
case of the Francophone West African countries is an example. These 
countries continue to receive immense financial support, in the form of 
economic and technical aid, from France. The majority of their trade is also 
with France. Any ECOWAS based integration process that aims at promot-
ing intra ECOWAS trade is likely to do so at the expense of France. The 
question therefore will be whether these Francophone countries are willing 
to pursue a regional agenda at the expense of their individual relationships 
with France? 
 
by 2010, subject to prior conclusion of relevant arrangements: Option I: Creating the 
ECOWAS Monetary Union on the basis of prescribed eligibility quantitative and 
qualitative convergence criteria; Option II: Creating the ECOWAS Monetary Union 
by political fiat with no prior conditions; and Option III: Creating the ECOWAS 
Monetary Union through accession by the non-UEMOA zone countries to the exist-
ing West African Economic and Monetary Union” (5). 
17 The West African Monetary Institute, Press Release: A Second Monetary Zone in 
West Africa to Energize the Integration Process and Economic Activity of the Sub 
Region (Accra, May 25, 2001), p. 2.  Chibuike Uche 
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IV.  
As has already been mentioned, since 1962 the Francophone West African 
countries have shared a common currency, the CFA Franc, which has a 
fixed parity with the French Franc. Operationally, the BCEAO has an ope-
rations account with the French Treasury into which they deposit 65 per-
cent of their foreign exchange holdings. Provisions for central bank over-
drafts on these accounts support convertibility of the CFA francs into 
French francs through authorized intermediaries. Traditionally, three basic 
mechanisms are used to control monetary growth in member countries. 
These include: charging interest on overdrafts and paying interests on cre-
dit balances in the central bank’s operations account; restricting credit pro-
vided by central banks to the government sector of the member countries to 
20 percent of its fiscal revenue in the previous year; and, requiring the 
BCEAO to restrict credit expansion to member countries whose central 
banks’ operations account falls below an agreed target level. These me-
chanisms are not intended to place an absolute ceiling on the credit growth 
of member countries. Rather, they are supposed to help encourage financial 
discipline and discourage inflation in the CFA Franc Zone.
18  
 
18 IMF Survey: A publication of the International Monetary Fund (January 24, 1994, p. 
18). This arrangement has changed little even with the actualization of monetary in-
tegration in the EU. It has, for instance, been asserted that: “With the coming into 
force of the European Union, it was agreed that France should be allowed to continue 
their exchange rate arrangements with WAEMU countries. The agreement was not 
considered to have any material effect on the monetary and exchange rate policy of 
the euro area or any obstacle to the smooth functioning of the economic and mone-
tary union. France was therefore explicitly allowed to continue their exchange rate ar-
rangements with the European Union must be obtained.” See European Union, 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Agreements of the Community and Member States with 
Third Countries and Territories (Information Note, Directorate General Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 2
nd February 2001). WAEMU countries after the sub-
stitution of the French Franc with the Euro. France is however obliged to keep the 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the Economic and Financial Committee 
informed on regular basis about the implementation of the agreement. Furthermore, 
France is obliged to inform the Economic and Financial Committee prior to changes 
of the parity between the Euro and the CFA. Should France want to modify the 
agreement to the extent that their nature and scope is not changed, they have only to 
inform the Commission, the European Central Bank and the Economic and Financial The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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In 1969 these countries decided to further deepen their relationships with 
the establishment of the Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’ouest 
(CEAO). This was with the active support of France. According to the then 
President of France -Georges Pompidou- such a Francophone grouping was 
necessary “in order to counter-balance the heavy weight of Nigeria.”
19   
 
Although it is generally believed that the pegging of the CFA franc to the 
French franc helps promote stability and economic growth in the CFA 
Franc zone, this has not always been the case. From 1985, the economic 
and financial conditions of the CEAO member countries began to deteri-
orate. This was mainly because of the sharp drop in world market prices of 
their main export commodities- cocoa, coffee, cotton and petroleum- and 
the appreciation of the French franc in the international market. Given the 
peg of the CFA franc to the French Francs, the CFA franc also appreciated 
considerably. This made the exports of the CEAO countries more expen-
sive and less competitive in the international markets. This made the eco-
nomies of these countries suffer great reverses.
20 It “led to a serious decline 
in the competitive position of the CFA franc zone and a substantial weak-
ening of the economic situation in the region.”
21 Under the monetary ar-
rangements in existence, the individual countries had limited scope for   
maneuver in their attempt to address their deteriorating economies. Indeed 
they could only attempt restructuring with fiscal policies. A number of 
countries tried to respond to these difficulties by strengthening their inter-
nal adjustment efforts. These internal measures, while necessary (especially 
 
Committee prior to such changes. Any plans to change the nature and scope of the 
exchange rate agreements have to be submitted to the Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the Economic and Financial Committee. Before such changes can 
come into effect, the approval of the Council of the  
19 Quoted in West Africa (7
th July, 1972, 867). 
20 Please note that the economic deterioration of the 1980s/ early 1990s was not limited 
to Francophone West African countries. Most Anglophone West African countries 
also had similar experiences and adopted various forms of structural adjustments to 
combat them.   
21 Hernandez-Cata et al., (1998), The West African Economic and Monetary Union: 
Recent Developments and Monetary Issues, International Monetary Fund Occa-
sional Paper Number 170 (Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund), p. 3. Chibuike Uche 
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those aimed at controlling wage costs and restructuring the public sector), 
proved to be insufficient, because of the magnitude of the shocks and the 
size of the imbalance. In fact, the “pursuit of this strategy resulted mainly 
in increased tax rates and cuts in priority current and capital expenditures, 
particularly on education, health and infrastructure, thereby jeopardizing 
the bases for sustainable growth.”
22  
 
The fact that the Francophone countries did not opt to go their way during 
these period of difficulties shows the role of an agency of restraint in long-
term monetary stability of any region. Furthermore, the fact that the coun-
tries concerned opted to make a uniform monetary adjustment – 50 percent 
devaluation of their currency – despite rather different economic situations, 
bears witness to their desire to maintain the solidarity that links them to-
gether. In fact the agreement was only possible with the approval of 
France. This was because France, as the hegemon of the system, economi-
cally supported CFA Franc member countries in coming to terms with the 
50 percent devaluation of their currency. France achieved this by: 
 
•  Canceling, unilaterally, a substantial portion of the debt of each 
country in the franc zone (F25 Million). For the poorest countries, all 
development assistance loans were forgiven while half of the deve-
lopment assistance loans for the middle-income countries were for-
given;  
 
•  Setting up a special development fund designed to improve the living 
conditions of the people residing in disadvantaged urban areas of the 
disadvantaged Francophone West African states; 
 
22 IMF Survey, February 7, 1994, p. 34. 
 The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
 21
•  Contributing significantly towards covering the Francophone West 
African countries’ financial requirements within the framework of 
programs agreed with the International Monetary Fund.
23  
 
These Francophone West African countries however did not stop at the de-
valuation of their currency. They used the opportunity to strengthen their 
political, economic and monetary solidarity and to reaffirm their commit-
ment to the principles and stability that characterize the franc zone.
24 This 
was done with the replacement of the CEAO with the WAEMU.
25 The 
main goals of WAEMU are: 
 
•  To reinforce the competition of the economic and financial activities 
of the member states in the context of an open and rival market and a 
rationalized and harmonized judicial environment; 
 
•  To ensure the convergence of the macroeconomic performances and 




23 IMF Survey, March 21, 1994, p. 20. 
24 Joint Declaration of the Chiefs of States and Heads of Government of the African 
Member Countries of the UMOA and BEAC Area (Dakar, January 11, 1994), repro-
duced in IMF Survey (Special Supplement) March 21 1994, p. 18). 
25 “The transformation in 1994 of the francophone monetary union (WAMU) into an 
economic and monetary union (WAEMU) caused quite a stir among the other 
ECOWAS countries. The reason given by WAEMU for deepening this co-operation 
arrangement was to have control over other national policies that affect the common 
monetary policy, and also enhance the contribution that a monetary union makes to 
the economic performance of the individual countries. Since ECOWAS has the same 
WAEMU objectives and already had programmes in the new areas, it seemed 
ECOWAS was not thought to be capable of moving fast enough, because of lack of 
commitment” See Economic Community of West African States, Regional Economic 
Groupings and ECOWAS Governance, Memorandum from ECOWAS Secretariat to 
the Workshop on “Vision 2010 and West Africa” (Abuja, 29-30 June 1997), p. 9.  Chibuike Uche 
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•  To create, among the member states, a common market based on the 
free movement of people, goods, services and capital and the right of 
the people, exercising an independent and remunerated activity, to 
establish a common external tariff and a common commercial policy;  
 
•  To harmonize, if the necessity arose for the good operation of the 
common market, legislation of the member states and especially the 
fiscal system; 
 
•  To institute a coordination for the national sector based policies with 
the implementation of common actions and, conceivably, common 
policies, especially in the following domains: community based land 
reclamation, agriculture, environment, transport, infrastructure, tele-
communications, human resources, energy, industries, mines and 
crafts.  
 
The WAEMU agreement was further strengthened in 1999 when the heads 
of states of WAEMU countries adopted the Regional Convergence, Stabili-
ty, Growth and Solidarity Pact. This was because the continued deprecia-
tion of the economies of the WAEMU member states made it evident that 
the existence of a common currency was not a sufficient condition for eco-
nomic growth to occur.
26 WAEMU thus adopted various convergence crite-
ria, similar to that of WAMA, with the aim of strengthening the 
convergence of the economies of the member countries, reinforcing ma-
croeconomic stability, accelerating economic growth and enhancing soli-
darity among member countries.
27  
 
26 Economic Community of West African States (2000), Establishment of A second 
Monetary Zone in West Africa: Main Report by the Technical Committee on Mone-
tary Issues (Abuja, Economic Community of West African States), p. 11. 
27 WAEMU adopted primary and secondary convergence criteria that were similar to 
those adopted by WAMA. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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Despite its checkered history, WAEMU is still seen as a model for mone-
tary integration in West Africa.
28 This is because its agency of restraint me-
chanism ensures economic stability, which is essential for economic 
development and growth. Admittedly, the experience of WAEMU has 
shown that member states of a monetary union, where the currency is ex-
ternally anchored, could suffer from externally induced shocks. The impact 
of such shocks will however be greatly reduced if member states of such a 
monetary union make concerted efforts to harmonize and converge their 
economies. The adoption, by WAEMU member states, of a Regional Con-
vergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact in 1999, should improve 
the resilience of the region to externally induced shocks in the future. It is 
therefore no surprise that some scholars have even suggested that a possible 
way forward for ECOWAS wide integration is for non WAEMU West 
African Countries to join the CFA Franc Zone.
29 For some time now, for 
instance, there has been growing pressure on Ghana to join WAEMU. A 
study commissioned by the Government of Ghana has however advised 
against such a move. According to the report: 
in view of Ghana’s historic commitment to the political and economic unity of 
West Africa, and particularly to the integration process of ECOWAS, which has 
been admirably sustained and variously demonstrated by the country’s leadership, 
coupled with the sharing of this commitment with Nigeria since the establishment 
of ECOWAS, it would not appear to be in the interest of Ghana to join UEMOA 
under Article 103 of the Union’s Treaty [as a full member] which might lead to a 
breakdown of the ECOWAS front and the abandonment of the country’s proud 
history and highly cherished heritage as vanguard of pan-Africanism and African 
independence. Significantly, too, UEMOA as an economic unit is a weak entity, 
particularly when viewed from the long-term perspective, compared to ECOWAS, 
as it does not present an optimal market size, so that even if the potential exists for 




28 WAMA Annual Report, 2007, p. 31. 
29 See, for instance, Soludo,C.C. (1995), A framework for Macroeconomic Policy Co-
ordination Among African Countries: The Case of the ECOWAS Sub-region, African 
Economic and Social Review, 1, p. 23-24. 
30 Asante, S. and Abankwa, A (1999), Report on a Study of the impact of the West Afri-
can Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) on Ghana (Submitted to the Ministry 
of Finance [Ghana] the Contracting Agency), p. 93. Chibuike Uche 
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From the above, it is clear that politics and nationalistic pride were major 
factors that shaped the advice that Ghana should not join WAEMU. This 
was so despite the fact that it is generally agreed that a strong and inte-
grated ECOWAS will yield better economic results for its member states 
than the current distraction created by the existence of a strong WAEMU 
within a weak ECOWAS. Rather than expand an existing body that is al-
ready functioning (WAEMU), colonial divide and pride prodded non 
WAEMU West African countries to establish a second monetary zone in 
the region. This strategy is supposed to help accelerate the achievement of 
an ECOWAS wide monetary union in the region. The weak assumption is 
that at the very least, this should help convince the CFA Franc group about 
the viability and feasibility of an ECOWAS single monetary zone.
31 
V. 
The idea of a second monetary zone in West Africa was championed by 
Nigeria (Under Olusegun Obasanjo) and Ghana (under Jerry Rawlings). In 
December 1999, the two countries met in Accra and agreed to set up a 
second monetary zone in West Africa that would embrace all the non CFA 
Franc West African countries. In April 2000, the Heads of States and Go-
vernments of the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nige-
ria signed an agreement (the Accra Declaration) for the establishment of a 
second monetary zone in West Africa.
32 This second monetary zone 
(WAMZ) was initially expected to come into force in January 2003 with 
the establishment of a West African Central Bank and the introduction of a 
Common Currency (the “Eco”) for the participant countries. The West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was also set up to help achieve the 




31 See Asante, R. (2001), The Rationale and Feasibility of a Second Monetary Zone in 
West Africa, The Bullion 25, p. 20.  
32 Guinea is the only non-English speaking country in the group. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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•  To provide the framework for intense cooperation between member 
central banks in WAMZ and to foster the feeling of ownership of the 
future central bank; 
 
•  To harmonize the laws and regulations of financial markets and insti-
tutions in member countries. Monetary policies and accounting prac-
tices of member countries are also to be harmonized;  
 
•  To study the issue of exchange rate parities within WAMZ and re-
commend the appropriate exchange rate mechanism and parities for 
the existing currencies in the second monetary zone; 
 
•  To monitor the state of convergence of member countries vis-à-vis 
the prescribed benchmarks;  
 
•  To promote the development of a payment system in WAMZ in or-
der to facilitate the implementation of a second monetary policy; 
 
•  To design the new currency to be issued by the West African Central 
Bank and to prepare for its implementation;  
 
•  To embark on a program of sensitization of the citizens of the parti-
cipating countries in order to create wide public support for the in-
troduction of the new currency; 
 
•  To create the conditions for a smooth transition to the new common 
currency by ensuring that regulations in member countries are con-
sistent with the introduction of a new currency, prices are quoted in 
the new currency as well as any other practical issues that will facili-Chibuike Uche 
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tate the smooth introduction of the new currency and the withdrawal 
of the old currencies.
33 
 
Based on the above, WAMI has developed convergence criteria, similar to 
those of WAMA and WAEMU, for the member countries. Specifically, 
WAMI has set out four primary and six secondary convergence criteria for 
member countries to adopt before the achievement of a single currency. 
The primary convergence criteria included: the attainment of a single digit 
inflation rate by 2000 and five percent by 2003, gross external reserves to 
cover at least three months of imports by end of 2000 and six months by 
end of 2003, central banks’ financing of government deficits to be limited 
to 10 percent of previous year’s tax revenues, budget deficits (excluding 
grants) to GDP ratio of not more than 5 percent by 2000 and 4 percent by 
2002.  
 
The secondary criteria include: prohibition of new domestic debt arrears 
and liquidation of all existing arrears, tax revenue GDP ratio to be equal to 
or more than 20 percent, public investment / tax revenue ratio to be equal to 
or more than 20 percent, maintenance of real exchange rate stability in the 
context of an exchange rate mechanism and the maintenance of positive 
real interest rates. Even with the multiple postponements of the com-
mencement date, there have been mixed results with respect to the attain-
ment of the above convergence criteria. According to a 2007 WAMI report:  
 At the end of 2007, the Gambia and Nigeria maintained the four primary criteria, 
which they had fulfilled in 2006. Guinea complied with two primary criteria com-
pared to one in 2006, whereas Sierra Leone and Ghana fulfilled two each. The 
Zone continued to make modest progress in respect of all the secondary criteria, 
except with the tax revenue/ GDP ratio which declined in 2006 and 2007, as well 
as the wage bill which expanded in the zone.
34  
 
33 See the West African Monetary Institute (2000), Agreements, Statutes and Other Pro-
visions of the West African Monetary Zone, Articles 4-7. 
34 See West African Monetary Institute, Macro Economic Convergence Report, 2007, 
23. More recently, the Director General of WAMI has asserted that: “With respect to 
performance on the macroeconomic convergence scale, overall compliance for the The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
 27
Even the progress that has been made towards the attainment of the set 
convergence criteria has not necessarily been because of the ability of 
WAMI to act as an agency of restraint to the WAMZ member countries. 
Rather, it has been induced externally by the attempts of the various mem-
ber countries to adhere to the IMF structural adjustment conditionality.
35  
   
Apart from these set convergence criteria, there are also other critical issues 
that WAMI is yet to address. It is for instance still not clear if all the 
WAMI member countries will proceed with monetary integration whether 
or not they achieve the WAMI prescribed convergence criteria. Further-
more, details are murky with respect to the planned merger of the two 
monetary zones which can only take place after WAMZ becomes opera-
tional. Even with numerous postponements, it is now doubtful whether the 
WAMZ would ever become operational. Political developments in WAMZ 
no doubt helped to complicate the integration process. As was mentioned 
earlier, the second monetary zone was championed by Nigeria and Ghana. 
Since then, however there have been changes of leadership in both coun-
tries. In January 2001, for instance, John Kufuor replaced Jerry Rawlings 
as President of Ghana. This now former president was keenly interested in 
an ECOWAS wide regional integration.
36 In practice, however, their ap-
proaches to regional integration turned out to be different. During his pre-
sidency, Kufuor moved to improve relations with the Francophone coun-
tries that sandwich his country. With respect to Togo, for instance, the 
 
Zone was two primary criteria, a deterioration from the previous assessment. The 
single digit inflation rate criterion was missed, although the level improved in 2009 
compared to 2008. During the assessment period, the Gambia met three primary cri-
teria, compared to all the four they had achieved and sustained since December 2006. 
Ghana met two of the criteria, an improvement on 2008 when none was met. 
Guinea’s performance deteriorated from two criteria in December 2008 to one in 
2009. Liberia and Nigeria attained three of the criteria in 2009. Sierra Leone slipped 
to one in 2009 as against two primary criteria in 2008.” See WAMI (2010), 29
th 
Meeting of the Technical Committee of the West African Monetary Zone, Final Re-
port (Banjul, the Gambia, July 27-28, 2010).  
35 Obikaonu, F. (2001), Monetary Cooperation Under Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS): Issues, Progress and Prospects, Bullion 25, p. 46. 
36 Quoted in the Gri Press Review [Ghana] of January 4, 2001. Chibuike Uche 
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usual tension around the Togo/ Ghana border was eased with the result that 
the opening hours of the border were extended considerably. Furthermore, 
Ghana under Kufuor also seriously considered joining the Organization 
pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA), which is 
a Francophone-dominated continental body that seeks to promote regional 
integration and economic growth through the harmonization of business 
laws in Africa.
37   
 
During the Kufuor presidency, the tempo of the second monetary zone not 
surprisingly changed. Ghanaian monetary authorities began to express re-
servations and called for caution in the march towards the establishment of 
the second monetary zone. The Governor of the Bank of Ghana at the time, 
for instance, argued that issues like the harmonization of accounting sys-
tems, banking regulation and the legal framework for public accounting 
should be given priority.
38 Based on the above, it was not surprising that for 
most parts of the Kufuor presidency the WAMZ activities came to a virtual 
standstill. In fact no Summits of Heads of States and Governments of 
WAMZ member countries have been held since May 2005 (WAMZ 2008, 
p.6).
39 The idea of a fast track program is at best in a state of paralysis.       
 
37 The idea of OHADA was first mooted in 1963 at a meeting of Justice Ministers of 16 
African Francophone countries. It was however not until October 17, 1993 that 14 
African states signed the treaty. The treaty, which came into force in September 19, 
1995, now has 16 signatory members. They include, among others, Ivory Coast, Bur-
kina Faso, Benin, Senegal, Mali and Togo (The Weekend Statesman [Ghana], Octo-
ber 25, 2001, p. 1).   
38 Acquah, P, Speech Delivered by Dr Paul Acquah, Governor of the Bank of Ghana at 
the Bank of England/ WAMI Workshop on Monetary Union (Accra, 28
th January, 
2002), p. 4-5. 
39 The West African Monetary Zone, 22
nd Meeting of the Convergence Council of Min-
isters and Governors of Central Banks of the West African Monetary Zone, Final Re-
port (Freetown, June 19, 2008), p. 6. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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VI. 
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the fast track program has all 
the hallmarks of the previous attempts by ECOWAS to achieve ECOWAS-
wide monetary integration. One of the main reasons for the failure of 
WACH was the absence of an external and efficient agency of restraint to 
help make member states to adhere to WACH regulations. It was therefore 
no surprise that EMCP made explicit the need for the proposed single mo-
netary zone to be supported by a convertibility guarantee arrangement with 
an appropriate external body. Unfortunately, WAMA, till date, has not 
been able to implement this. The current program for the establishment of a 
second monetary zone also has the same problem. It is difficult to see how 
very poor countries can adhere to strict convergence criteria capable of, at 
least sometimes, causing social upheaval at home, unless a strong agency 
of restraint can enforce compliance. Although a Stabilization Cooperation 
Fund has been set up under the WAMZ program, this is simply not enough. 
It has, for instance, been argued that: 
… at present details are lacking on how the fund might function. It should be 
noted that for such a fund to be operational, the commitment of each country to 
help out its neighbors must be strong. In the past, some countries have not paid 
their dues to the ECOWAS institutions for many years. In addition, given the size 
of Nigeria relative to its neighbors, the operation of such a fund may well be 
asymmetric. Transfers to the smaller countries if they get into difficulties could be 




The proponents of monetary union in West Africa argue that it could, by 
taming inflation and stabilizing exchange rates, help create conditions that 
will enhance opportunities for economic growth.
41 This however can only 
happen when there are incentives for the countries to remain part of the 
 
40 Masson, P. and Pattillo, C. (2001b), Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS): An 
Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policy? International monetary Fund Working Paper 
WP01/34, p. 13. 
41 See Asante, R. and Masson, P. (2001), The Pros and Cons of Expanded Monetary 
Union in West Africa: Talk with Jacqueline Irving of the IMF’s External Relations 
Department, Finance and Development 38, p. 25.   Chibuike Uche 
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scheme. Where there is no loss of benefits occurring by being on the out-
side, member countries could rescind their membership of such unions, and 
opt for expansionary credit policies, when faced with domestic economic 
problems.
42   
 
Unfortunately, neither the ECOWAS-wide monetary integration program 
nor the second monetary zone, as currently constituted, have the required 
restraint mechanism. Although it can be argued that these organizations are 
currently inching closer to the required convergence standards, it is unlike-
ly that the integration program is the cause of such convergence. In fact, as 
has already been argued, the adherence to the convergence criteria has been 
IMF/ World Bank induced. This is so since most of the countries in the 
second monetary zone are currently undergoing various spells of structural 
adjustment programs. In other words, the current level of adherence to fis-
cal and monetary discipline has been achieved mainly because the IMF 
serves as the agency of restraint.  For most of these countries, it makes 
economic sense to adhere to IMF conditionality rather than risk facing 
sanctions from the body.  
 
For the Francophone West African countries, the pegging of the currency 
to the Euro, with the support of France, gives France the authority to act as 
agency of restraint to the region. Francophone countries therefore have to 
choose between continued French assistance and pursuing monetary expan-
sionist policies. So far, few former French colonies have dared to exit the 
CFA Franc Zone. The long-term relationships of the Francophone countries 
have been yielding dividends on other sectors of financial and economic 
cooperation. These countries now have a common Banking Commission 
which licenses and regulates the financial system across the region. Most of 
the Francophone West African countries are also signatories to the 
OHADA treaty. It is therefore no surprise that intra regional financial 
 
42 Masson, P. and Pattillo, C. (2001), Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS): Is it 
Desirable and How Could it be Achieved? International Monetary Fund Occasional 
Paper Number 204, p. 25. The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
 31
movements and financial cooperation are much more advanced among 
WAEMU countries than among the member countries of WAMZ.   
 
This perhaps explains why Ghana has been seriously considering synchro-
nizing its business laws with those of the Francophone countries by becom-
ing a signatory to the OHADA Treaty. This makes economic sense. As has 
already been mentioned, Ghana has no land borders with any of the mem-
bers of the second monetary zone and is sandwiched by three Francophone 
states (Togo, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). Ghana is however not the  
only country in that situation. Niger, which is a landlocked country, is geo-
graphically proximate to Nigeria rather than the Francophone West African 
states. Gambia is also surrounded by Senegal. The above geographical dis-
parities and divisions no doubt result in sub-optimal trade and economic 
relationships among the countries involved. An ECOWAS wide integration 
program therefore makes economic sense.  
 
Ideally, one would have suggested the integration of Ghana into the 
UEMOA region as a starting point. Unfortunately, the current agreement 
France has with its EU partners, with respect to its monetary relationship 
with WAEMU countries is unlikely to permit this. According to the Chief 
of Service of the Franc Zone in the Bank of France- Mr. Emmanuel Car-
rere: 
The admission of new members into the Franc Zone would be difficult if not im-
possible since it took France some time to convince its European partners that its 
relationship with the Franc Zone countries was only a budgetary issue and that the 
activities of these countries would not significantly affect the money supply of the 
Euro Zone and… the creation of a single monetary zone in ECOWAS…. would 
result in the extinction of the Franc Zone in West Africa.
43  
 
Given the above, it is difficult to see how any meaningful progress can be 
made on the ECOWAS integration project without the endorsement of 
France and, to some extent, the European Union. This is so because it is 
unlikely that the WAEMU countries will be willing to forfeit the current 
 
43 Quoted in WAMI News (Volume 1, Number 3, December 2001, p. 30). Chibuike Uche 
32   
arrangement with the EU for wider cooperation with non-WAEMU coun-
tries.  
 
Although France has traditionally been uncomfortable with the size of Ni-
geria and its potential for dominating West Africa, recent developments 
may be changing all that. First of all, the passage of time has shown that the 
projected economic potential of Nigeria was rather too optimistic. Further-
more, the interest of France in Francophone West African region may be 
waning. This arguably is responsible for the recent social and political de-
generation of the largest economic power in Francophone West Africa-
Ivory Coast.  Finally, recent developments in the European Union create 
genuine opportunities for ECOWAS-wide integration. This is especially so 
given the fact that the intra ECOWAS divide had its origins in European 
colonization. With the coming together of these European countries, their 
political and economic differences should begin to disappear, thus creating 
opportunities for ECOWAS-wide integration.  
 
Interestingly, European Union member states have, in the past, greatly sup-
ported ECOWAS countries through various forms of aid. In fact the contri-
butions of member countries, if aggregated, constitute the largest segment 
of aid to the West African region.
44 Poverty reduction and economic 
growth in Africa have often emerged as one of the main objectives of the 
EU international economic relations. Achieving this has however not been 
easy.
45 The EU has continuously balanced its commitment to the develop-
ment of poor countries and the irreversible move towards economic open-
ness and globalization. Although there are various preferential trade 
arrangements between the EU and West African countries, the expectation 
is that these will gradually give way to free trade.  
 
44 The World Bank (2000), Can Africa Claim the 21
st Century? (Washington DC, The 
World Bank), p. 240. 
45 This is partly because the idea of aid has been politicized and used to serve other pur-
poses. See, for instance, World Bank (2000, p. 238). The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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Based on the above, it is not surprising that some development institutions 
including the World Bank and the African Development Bank have started 
advancing the concept of open regionalism.
46 The idea is that integration 
should not be seen as an end in itself. Rather, it should be seen as an effec-
tive vehicle for the integration of West Africa into the world economy.
47   
 
Some West African countries are however skeptical about this concept of 
open regionalism. They argue that it is based on the same principles as 
structural adjustment. Under various spells of IMF imposed structural ad-
justment programs, most ECOWAS member states have seen their econo-
mies shrink. This however does not tell the whole story. IMF has been 
traditionally invited when things go wrong in the economy. Prior to the 
adoption of SAPs most ECOWAS countries practiced import substitution, 
backward integration and protectionist policies. With the benefit of hind-
sight, we now know that such policies do not work. Furthermore, locking 
West Africa in to itself may well be an uneconomic venture. The geogra-
phy of the region has been described thus: 
 
46 According to the African Development Bank, the principle of open regionalism en-
tails: “progressive integration of the regional economies into the global economy 
through complementary unilateral and multilateral liberalization in parallel with the 
adoption and implementation of regional integrating initiatives. In the process coun-
tries will be encouraged to pursue integration measures consistent with rules-based 
world trading system and to undertake and/or continue to implement outward-
oriented trade and exchange reforms under the stabilization and structural adjustment 
programs supported by other relevant development partners…. Given the apparent ir-
reversibility and growing importance of globalization, open regionalism requires the 
creation of regional infrastructure, large integrated regional markets with economies 
of scale in production, credible policy environment to attract foreign and domestic 
investment, the adoption of new productivity enhancing technology leading to im-
provements in international competitiveness of the region’s industries. This process 
will not only increase the regional production base; it will also foster the creation of a 
large economic space for trade creation with dynamic regional effects. In addition, it 
will provide regional entrepreneurs the competitive environment for production and 
entry into the global export market.” See African Development Report (Abidjan, Af-
rican Development Bank, 2000), p. 13. 
47 Quattara, A.D. (1999), Regional Integration in Africa: An Important Step Toward 
Global Integration Paper Presented at the First Conference of Ministers of Economy 
and Finance of French Speaking Countries (Monaco, April 14, 1999), p. 2. Chibuike Uche 
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West Africa is highly fragmented as a result of geographic, demographic, political 
and policy related reasons. The 236 million inhabitants are very unevenly distri-
buted among countries, with Nigeria containing half the total population and se-
veral countries having less than a million people. There is no indigenous, widely 
used language for commerce, such as Swahili in Eastern Africa but rather three 
official European languages, still not understood by large segments of the popula-
tion. The region is roughly one-third desert, one-third Sudano Sahelian, with ra-
ther irregular rainfall and one third humid and rather more favorable for 
agricultural development. Except in the urbanized areas along the Atlantic coast, 
population density is low. Nearly half of the area is formed of landlocked coun-
tries. Internal distances as well as distances to core markets (about 50 percent 
greater than in East Asia) are enormous and transport infrastructure networks are 
only partially interconnected between countries- since they had been originally 
conceived to serve the colonial interests rather than the region’s, and they are very 
poorly maintained. Because of natural obstacles, political fragmentation, and in-
appropriate polices, national markets are tiny and regional markets remain unde-
veloped. As a result, infrastructure costs are among the highest in the world; 
electricity costs are on average 4.5 times higher than in the OECD countries and 
two times higher than in Latin America. The rates for international telephone calls 
are about 4 times higher than in OECD and 2.5 times higher than in Latin Ameri-
ca, also on average.
48 
 
For the economic development of West Africa, therefore, the problem may 
not be with open regionalism. Rather, the problem may be with the internal 
factors that inhibit the competitiveness of the region. One such problem is 
the availability of a stable and convertible currency for the ECOWAS 
Member states.
49 Luckily, the French experiment with the Francophone 
West African states has shown that this problem is not insurmountable and 
that the potential costs on Western countries may not be material. Choosing 
an anchor currency and establishing an ECOWAS wide exchange rate me-
chanism will however be more problematic. There are, at present, dispari-
ties with respect to the Francophone approach and the WAMZ proposition. 
While the CFA franc has a fixed parity with the Euro, the WAMZ ar-
rangement will be based on an exchange rate mechanism with a 15 percent 
fluctuation band and anchored on the US Dollar. Although most of the raw 
materials, which are the main export of West African countries, are quoted 
 
48 The World Bank (2001), Memorandum of the President of the International Devel-
opment Association to the Executive Directors on a Regional Integration Assistance 
Strategy for West Africa, p. 2. 
49 See World Bank (2000, 2001) for an analysis of other constraining factors.  The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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in US Dollars
50, the fact remains that most of African trade is with Eu-
rope.
51 Furthermore, West Africa is, by far, historically and culturally clo-
ser to Europe than the USA. European Union member states are also the 
largest aid donors to the sub-region. Alignment of the West African curren-
cy with the Euro would therefore be more appropriate. Maintenance of a 
fixed parity with the Euro will also be preferable to a fluctuation band. This 
is even more so especially given the fact that the monetary arrangement for 
the Francophone West Africa area has been tested while that for the 
WAMZ zone is still a proposition.
 52 Funds currently wasted on unproduc-
tive ventures in the name of aid could well be diverted to help support the 
proposed fixed parity arrangement.
53 There is now a clear opportunity for 
the European Union to operationalize its usual advocacy of being interested 
in the economic development of West Africa by acting as an agency of re-
straint for ECOWAS countries. Although currency convertibility and sta-
bility will not automatically ensure economic growth in ECOWAS, it will 
be a convenient starting point. At the very least, it will help foster the crea-
tion of a large economic space, which will positively impact on the eco-
nomic development of the region. It will also help to hasten the dismantling 
of the existing barriers to intra community trade and economic cooperation. 
For this arrangement to make long-term economic sense and lead to sus-
tainable development for stakeholder West African countries, it must be 
seen not as an end in itself but as an essential step towards the ultimate goal 
 
50 Trade in raw materials is mainly invoiced in US dollars and to a lesser extent, the 
Pound Sterling. That is because the quotation of raw material prices on international 
markets are, in most cases, in US dollars or in Pounds Sterling. See Bekx, P. (1998), 
The Implications of the Introduction of the Euro for non EU Countries, Euro Papers 
Number 26, p. 8-9. 
51 See World Bank (1998), African Development Indicators 1998/99 (Washington D.C., 
The World Bank), p. 122-136. 
52 “The membership of UEMOA countries in ECOWAS should, however, be a blessing 
in the development of a monetary union involving all countries in the sub region. The 
UEMOA experience is unique as it is not based on the traditional approaches to 
monetary integration. Its unique status as a common currency has been helped by the 
link between its currency- the CFA franc and the French franc, which guarantees its 
free convertibility into the French Franc [now Euro]” (ECOWAS, 2000, p.3).   
53 See World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001, (Washington DC, The 
World Bank), p. 192.    Chibuike Uche 
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of internalizing the monetary restraint mechanism in the West African sub-
region. It is also unlikely that any monetary support scheme, which has no 
explicit timeframe, will be acceptable to the European Union.  
VII. 
From the above, it is clear that an ECOWAS-wide monetary zone will be 
of benefit to all the countries in the West African sub region. It is however 
also clear that it would be difficult to achieve such a union without an 
agency of restraint mechanism. In fact, WAEMU, which is the only func-
tioning monetary union in the sub region, exists mainly because the Euro-
pean Union, through France, provides such an agency of restraint 
mechanism. The Second Monetary Zone, championed by Nigeria and Gha-
na, is however yet to take off. Its December 2009 deadline for the operatio-
nalization of its currency, the Eco, has passed unceremoniously and no new 
date has been set. The absence of an agency of restraint mechanism is no 
doubt a major hindrance to the actualization of this project. The idea of a 
Second monetary Zone is thus a fast disappearing dream. The only viable 
alternative therefore is for the WAEMU to be expanded to bring on board 
members of the Second Monetary Zone. There will however be two major 
obstacles to this happening. First, most of the Anglophone West African 
countries will be reluctant to join a francophone organization because of 
their colonial heritage and sometimes, nationalistic pride. The second rea-
son is the fact that France (and the European Union), which acts as the 
agency of restraint for WAEMU, may be reluctant to expand the current 
membership of WAEMU.  
 
The author believes that the second problem is not insurmountable. It will, 
for instance, not be difficult to convince the European Union that the politi-
cal and economic developments in Europe have now created a unique op-
portunity for it to help unite a region it helped to divide. The colonial 
attachment of some European Union countries towards the region arguably 
explains the fact that Europe remains the greatest aid donor to West Africa. 
Eradicating poverty in Africa also features regularly on the agenda of the The European Union and Monetary Integration in West Africa 
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European Union presidency. At the economic level, such a West African- 
wide monetary union guaranteed by Europe will also enhance Europe’s 
trade and investment relationship with the region.  
 
The obstacles relating to colonial heritage and nationalistic pride will also 
not be difficult to surmount. The very fact that all the European countries 
that participated in the partitioning of the West African sub region have 
now united under the European Union has blunted western interests in en-
suring the continued division of the region. The issue of nationalistic pride 
will no doubt vary from country to country. The first step towards achiev-
ing an ECOWAS-wide monetary integration arrangement would be for the 
European Union to withdraw its resistance towards the expansion of 
WAEMU. There must however be strict and clear rules guiding the admis-
sion of new members into WAEMU and only countries that meet the set 
convergence criteria should be admitted. There should also be explicit pe-
nalties for default.
54 This will, at the very least, ensure that willing new en-
trants will take decisions that could impact on their membership or 
suspension from the union more seriously.  Furthermore, to be acceptable 
to all the stakeholders, Europe cannot be expected to act as an agency of 
restraint for an expanded WAEMU for an infinite period. The ultimate goal 
must be to internalize the restraint mechanisms in the sub-region. It is, for 
instance, easier for the European Union to agree to act as an agency of re-
straint to an expanded WAEMU for an agreed period of time – say, 25 
years in the first instance. There is also no reason why the Francophone 
West African countries will not consent to the expansion of WAEMU. This 
will at the very least help integrate their economies with those of their An-
glophone neighbors without necessarily upsetting their economic relation-
ship with Europe.  
 
54 “Regional integration is no substitute for reforming the nation-state across Africa. 
Successful regional integration requires a solid preparation of each member state of a 
regional grouping.” See Kühnhardt, L. (2008), African Regional Integration and the 
Role of the European Union, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) 
Discussion Paper C184 (Bonn, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität), p. 9.    Chibuike Uche 
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Once a framework for admitting new members into WAEMU has been put 
in place, it is likely that some WAMZ member countries will apply to join. 
Guinea, which was traditionally a Francophone country before it was ostra-
cized in 1958, is one such country. Its current interest in WAMZ, whose 
takeoff date has since passed unceremoniously, is clearly because it has no 
choice. Liberia, which was not a British colony, is also another candidate. 
Without British interference, it is also likely that Ghana, Sierra Leone and 
Gambia, which are all encircled by Francophone countries, will all consider 
joining WAEMU. For the above West African countries, membership of an 
expanded WAEMU will help force them to adhere to macroeconomic poli-
cy discipline and ensure monetary stability and currency convertibility. The 
attendant trade and investment benefits will no doubt be immense. It is 
however unlikely that Nigeria will join such a Union, at least in the short 
run. Aside from its colonial heritage, Nigeria has over the years, partly due 
to its oil wealth and sheer size, acquired enormous nationalistic pride that 
will sabotage its joining WAEMU. This however should not be seen as a 
hindrance to the above proposal. This is because, in the future, it would be 
easier to integrate Nigeria and an expanded WAEMU into a single mone-
tary zone than the current approach of trying to achieve an increasingly dif-
ficult Second Monetary Zone, which will then be integrated with WAEMU.  
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